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Abstract—The work presented in this paper aims to propose a 
methodology of analyzing infrastructure network vulnerability 
in the field of prevention or reduction of the natural disaster 
consequences. After a state of the art on vulnerability models 
in the academic literature, the various vulnerability factors are 
classified and discussed. Eventually, a general model of 
vulnerability analysis including societal parameters is 
presented. 
Keywords-risk; vulnerability; decision support; network; 
natural disaster; complex system, modelisation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Our societies depend increasingly on complex 
infrastructure [1], [2], [3]. These infrastructures (transport, 
energy, telecommunication etc.) are critical and vital for the 
society [4], but are also vulnerable to hazards [3]. 
Systems represented by networks can aggravate or 
mitigate the hazard effects with respect to their use. The 
analysis of networks vulnerability is a way of prevention 
during the design phase in order to effectively integrate the 
networks in their environment, but also as a detection of 
critical elements throughout its exploitation phase.[5]. Hence 
there is a need for network and vulnerability models to 
analyze the performances before a feared event and to 
support decision in the crisis phase. This is the objective of 
our study because a network failure in some cases can cause 
paralysis of an entire country [6]. In the following lines we 
define the key concepts for the analysis of the vulnerability 
and risk before proceeding to a literature review of network 
modeling. We then describe the vulnerability models used in 
the literature. Following, we present the limitations of these 
models and introduce the elements to be incorporated. 
Finally, we comment the analysis model and conclude with 
some working perspectives. 
II. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
The analysis of the vulnerability is often related to risk 
analysis [7]. The concept of vulnerability is sometimes 
confused with the risk in the literature [7], [8]. To distinguish 
the two concepts, let us consider a system to analyze (Figure 
1). 
From the two standpoints (risk and vulnerability), the 
output may be represented by a function 	୧  (health of 
populations), a difference ο	୧  (increase of water 
consumption), a wrong output (bad information) 	నഥ , or a 
probability of one or more of these elements. The system 
input is described by uncertain causes (୧) or a probability 
on these causes ሺ୧ሻ. Risk analysis deal with the Outputs 
and the Inputs without considering the structure and the 
dynamic of the system. The risk in this case is an entity 
composed of a probability (ሺ୧ሻ ) on one hand and the 
consequences (	నഥ  or ο	୧) on the other hand [9]. Some authors 
consider the risk as the probability of an undesirable result 
(ሺ	నഥሻሺο	୧ሻ) [10] . Others authors define the risk as the 
cumulative effects of uncertain occurrences (୧ ) adversely 
affecting (	నഥ  or ο	୧) the goals (	୧) [11], or the possibility 
that a fact (୧) having undesirable consequences (	నഥ ) occur 
[12]. Reference [13] present the risk as the consequences (	నഥ  
or ο	୧ ) of a set of causes (୧) on the system. References [14] 
and [15] define risk as an uncertain event (୧) or condition 
(ሺ୍ሻ) which, if it occurs, has a positive (	୧) or negative 
(	నഥ ) effects on a project objectives. All these authors take 
into interest the effects or consequences of the Inputs on the 
Outputs. 
The vulnerability is documented in various ways in the 
literature. Contrary to the risk analysis, vulnerability analysis 
is used to characterize the lack of robustness or lack of 
resilience of a system. [7], [16]. Robustness is the system's 
ability to resist to the random evolution of its environment 
while resilience is its ability to recover its nominal function 
following the occurrence of a disruption. We are then 
interested in the system itself (structure and function) rather 
than its Outputs or its Inputs. Vulnerability is often defined 
as "the probability of a complete or partial failure of 
infrastructures and loss of their ability to maintain their 
important functions for a certain period" [3], or as "the 
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Figure 2: Elementary system to analyze 
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Figure 1: Risk and vulnerability analysis 
propensity to damage or malfunction of various elements 
exposed to risk (commodities, peoples, activities, functions, 
systems) constituent a territory and a given society” [17]. 
Based on these definitions, the fundamental difference 
between risk and vulnerability is that the former focuses on 
the Input and the Output while the second concentrates on 
the system and its Input (or on the system and its Output, less 
frequently on the three elements). 
We define the vulnerability and the risk considering three 
elements: The Population, the Territory and the Hazard 
A. Stake 
The stake is the union of Population and Territory. We 
define it like “a material or immaterial entity providing a 
function whose deterioration is damageable or prejudicial for 
the society. The term damage alludes to materials damage 
while losses refer to human lives [18] and prejudice concerns 
peoples damages [17]. The vulnerability analysis is on the 
intersection of hazard and stake. We will not talk about 
vulnerability in the case of a hazard that does not affect any 
stake. 
B. Hazard 
The vulnerability analysis assumes the presence of 
anthropic or natural phenomena which is not under control 
and that we call Hazard. The specificity of hazard is that we 
cannot predict its occurrence date and its intensity at the 
same time. From this perspective, a predicted snowstorm 
with a determined intensity could not be considered as 
hazard. On the other hand, if for some reason, this intensity 
cannot be approximated with an acceptable leeway, the 
snowstorm becomes in this case a hazard. The accident is in 
this case a manifestation of a hazard. 
It should be noted that a phenomenon which do not affect 
any stake could not be considered as a hazard. For instance, 
an earthquake in an inhabited area without infrastructure will 
not be a hazard whatever its frequency and its intensity. 
Others parameters than frequencies and intensities are to be 
taken into account in the hazard analysis. Like failure mode, 
number and detectability of heralds signs. 
C. Population. 
The consequences of hazard often depend on the societal 
position of the occurrence place [7]. The population is the 
group of people living on a given territory or likely to be 
affected by a hazard. It is the central element of our model 
and is divided into three dependents factors: psychological 
(stress, fear); physiological (age, sex, health), economical 
(healthiness or poverty). 
D. Territory 
The territory is the component that will mitigate or 
aggravate the hazard effect on the population. We have 
chosen to distinguish the territory from the population 
insomuch as there are some populations that have no stable 
territory1. On a territory we can distinguish various factors of 
vulnerability: soil and subsoil, infrastructures (networks and 
buildings), institutions, economy and environment. A 
distinction may be done between infrastructures like 
buildings, bridges and networks. 
Networks are presents at all levels of our lives. There are 
four categories of networks [19]: technological networks (the 
electric power grid, the internet), information networks 
(network of citations between academic papers, World Wide 
Web), social networks (the patterns of friendships between 
individuals, business relationships between companies, 
intermarriages between families) and biological networks 
(genetic regulatory network, food web, Neural2  networks) 
[19]. Technological networks are man-made networks for 
transporting materials and information. The hazard effects 
are felt by the population through perturbations of network 
performances. The vulnerability analysis might take into 
account the network structure, its dynamic and its 
background (Machinery, Manpower, Material, Measurement, 
and Method). 
E. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability has two main components. The robustness 
(or resistance) and the resilience. The resilience is defined 
considering the nominal state of the system to be analyzed 
and determine the stake’s aptitude to recover this nominal 
state. We define the vulnerability as “the incapacity of a 
stake to resist to the occurrence of a hazard and to recover 
efficiently its nominal function during a given period of 
time”. A stake can be vulnerable to a hazard without being 
exposed to this hazard. More a stake will resist to the hazard 
effects and will recover quickly its nominal functions less it 
will be vulnerable. 
F. Risk 
Sometimes, vulnerability is considered as a component of 
risk which is then perceived as the conjunction of hazard and 
vulnerability [20]. We define the risk as an exposition 
probability of a stake to a hazard and/or the probability of 
negatives consequences at a given time in specified 
conditions. 
III. NETWORKS MODELLING 
In the literature we often use the graph theory to model 
network. Most of the communication and transportations 
systems (technological networks) can be represented by a 
graph [21]. A finite graph 
 ൌ ሺǡ ሻis defined by a finite 
set of nodes  ൌ ሼଵǡ ଶǥ Ǥ ୒ሽ ; (ȁȁ ൌ ሻ and a finite set 
of edge  } ( ). The analysis of 
1 This is true of some nomadic peoples. Otherwise territory 
can be uninhabited 
2 Referring to the topology of real neural networks 
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Figure 3 Elements of vulnerability 
some structural parameters enables to quantify networks 
vulnerabilities. Following, we describe these parameters. 
A. Degree 
For a graph, a node degree is the sum of incoming and 
outgoing edges. For a node ୧ the degree is: [22]: ሺ୧ሻ ൌ  ାሺ୧ሻ ൅ ିሺ୧ሻ (1) 
There are a lot of ways to quantify the edge degree in the 
literature [23]. The product of incident node degrees seems 
to be the best choice, because it offers the best correlation 
between the edge degree and the coefficient of centrality. For 
an edge ୧ the degree is given by: ሺ୧ሻ ൌ ሺ୧ሻ ൈ ሺ୩ሻ (2) 
The degree is the vulnerability analysis parameter in an 
intuitive way [24] but not stand for determining the network 
global state [25]. The degree is not all the time the most 
important term of efficiency and vulnerability [2]. In the case 
of ponderated network, the weight is often used in place of 
degree. The degree is then the sum of edge weight [24]. 
B. Betweenness  
The betweenness define the fraction of path going 
through a node ୧ [23]. 
ሺ୧ሻ ൌ σ ஢౩౪ሺ୧ሻ஢౩౪ ୱஷ୧ஷ୲  (3) 
Where ߪ௦௧ is the number of total paths from the edge ୱ 
to the edge ୲  and ߪ௦௧ሺ݅ሻ  is the number of paths going 
through ୧. The load is defined in the same way for an edge ୧ [23]. 
൫୧୨൯ ൌ σ ஢౩౪ሺ୧ሻ஢౩౪ୱஷ୧ஷ୲  (4) 
The centrality determines the importance of a node in the 
network [23] and defines the resilience to attacks [26]. It is 
calculated before and after the occurrence of the hazard 
(which means the removal of one or many nodes/edges) [5], 
[22], [27]. 
C. Average Path Length  
The average path length between two nodes is the mean 
of the edges number of shortest paths [16]. κ ൌ൏ ݈൫୧ǡ ୨൯ ൐ൌ ଵ୒ሺ୒ିଵሻσ ൫୧ǡ ୨൯୧ஷ୨א୚  (5) 
To avoid infinite mean (the distance is infinite if no link 
exists between the nodes), we use the inverse of the average 
path [22] and [23]. κԢ ൌ ଵ୒ሺ୒ିଵሻσ σ ଵୈ൫୚౟ǡ୚ౠ൯୨୧  (6) 
The average path measures the dispersion of the network 
and expresses the difficulty of transferring elements between 
two nodes. [4]. It also indicates the flow of traffic on the 
network. 
D. Clustering coefficient  
Let us consider three nodes ୧, ୨ et ୱ. If the node ୧ is 
linked to the node ୨ , and the node ୨  to the node ୱ , the 
transitivity is the average probability that the node ୧  is 
linked to the node ୱ. It measures the density of triangles in 
the network [16]. The number of possible connections for a 
vertex of degree ݀ሺ୧ሻ is [16]: ൫ୢሺ୚౟ሻଶ ൯ ൌ ୢሺ୚౟ሻሾୢሺ୚౟ሻିଵሿଶ  (7) 
By noting ୧  the number of links between vertices 
incident to vertex ୧, the clustering coefficient of vertex ୧ is 
then [16]: ୧ ൌ ୑౟ቀ మౚሺ౒౟ሻቁ (8) 
And that of the graph is [16] and [23]: ሺ
ሻ ൌ ଵ୒σ ୧୧  (9) 
E. Connectivity: 
The connectivity of vertices (respectively edges) of a 
graph is the minimum number of vertices (respectively 
edges) to remove from the graph to disconnect it [28] and 
[25]. A disconnected graph is a graph for which no element 
can reach its destination. Connectivity is a measure of 
vulnerability [16]. Connectivity of the vertices is also called 
cohesion of the graph and that of edges; adhesion of the 
graph. We can classify networks according to one of these 
parameters. We introduce below one of these classifications. 
IV. MODELS OF NETWORK 
From a structural point of view, we can classify networks 
according to their degree distribution ሺሻ  [26]. This 
classification gives rise to three categories of network [16]: 
scale-free network, random graphs, and small word network. 
A. Scale-free Network (Barbàsi-Albert) 
These are networks for which the node fraction with a 
degree  follows a power law [29], [16], [26]: ሺሻ ׽ ିஓ (10) 
This is the case of networks like the power grids [29], the 
World Wide Web, the internet, and the air networks [5]. 
B. Random graph (Erdös-Rényi) 
In general, in the Erdös-Rényi model, the probability that 
a vertex is of degree ݇ is given by the binomial law [26], 
[16]: 
ሺሻ ൌ ൫୒ିଵ୩ ൯୩ሺͳ െ ሻ୒ିଵି୩  (11) 
The average distance for these networks is proportional 
to ܰ [16]. 
C. Small word network 
For these networks, the distance between two nodes 
decreases very slowly with the number of nodes [24]. It 
reflects the fact that although the number of vertices in the 
graph is high, the average distance is relatively short. These 
networks combine a high degree of agglomeration and a low 
average distance [16]. 
V. LITERATURE REVIEW OF STRUCTURAL 
VULNERABILITY 
Often some authors consider that the effectiveness of the 
realization of the network functions is affected by its 
structure [30]. At the occurrence of a hazard, loses and 
damage depends on the structural organization and varies 
from one network to another [31]. Analyzing the topology of 
the network allows a better comprehension of the dynamic 
phenomena that affects its performances [25] and the 
identification of its weaknesses [8]. Some structural 
parameters defined above enable an estimation of the 
vulnerability [25], [6]. In the literature, there are other 
parameters related to resilience, component of vulnerability, 
which can be simulated by removing one or more vertices 
and edges [2]. The second component, the robustness is 
defined in [4] as the ability to maintain its connectivity 
properties after damage of one or more of its components 
(nodes and edges). Others authors consider that it depends on 
the network degree distribution [25]. From a structural point 
of view, the vulnerability can be defined as the probability of 
damage to all or part of an infrastructure and the loss of its 
ability to maintain its important functions during a certain 
period [3]. The main parameters of vulnerability measure 
include the degree, the clustering coefficient, the average 
distance, and the load [25]. Besides these obvious 
parameters, there are four other classes namely: efficiency, 
integrity, probability and others vulnerability functions. 
Whatever the function used, the vulnerability might not 
increase with the addition of edge [25] and its analysis 
should help to measure the system response after the attacks 
[31]. 
A. Efficiency 
References [2], [5], and [4] define vulnerability as the 
lack of network performance. This performance also known 
as efficiency is defined as a function of the average distance 
between nodes [4] and [32]: Ԅሺ
ሻ ൌ ሺ
ሻ ൌ ଵ୒ሺ୒ିଵሻσ ଵୈ൫୚౟ǡ୚ᇱౠ൯୧ஷ୨אୋ  (12) 
The efficiency of a path between two vertices is the 
average efficiency of all the edges constituting the path and 
determines the movement fluidity of the elements between 
the two nodes. Resilience, which is one of the measures of 
vulnerability, is the drop of efficiency induced by the 
deterioration of edges [4] and [27]. ሺ୧ሻ ൌ ୉ሺୋሻି୉ᇱሺୋሻ୉ሺୋሻ  (13) ሺ
ሻ is the overall efficiency of the system and Ԣሺ
ሻ is 
the efficiency of the network after removal of the edge ୧. 
The overall vulnerability is then defined by: ሺ
ሻ ൌ ሾሺ୧ሻሿ (14) 
Finally, some authors consider the loss of performance 
caused by the removal of a vertex instead of an edge [33] and 
[31]. 
B. Integrity 
References [24], [1] and [34] define vulnerability as a 
lack of integrity. Integrity is the quotient ୥Ȁ଴. Where୥ is 
the size of the graph after damage of a fraction  of nodes 
compared with the initial size ଴ . Others authors define 
integrity in relation to the weight, the geodesic distance and 
the range (ratio between the distance and weight) [2]. 
C. Probability 
The vulnerability of a system is measured in [16] and 
[35] as the probability ୔ሺ୫ୟ୶ሺଡ଼ሺ୲ሻሻவ௫ሻ୲א୘  for a given period of 
time ܶǡ that the negative consequence ሺሻ  of the 
disturbance is greater than a value . Taking into account the 
occurrence of a hazard ୧, the total probability would be the 
sum of probabilities. ୔ሺ୫ୟ୶ሺଡ଼ሺ୲ሻሻவ௫ሻ୲א୘ ൌ σ ሺ୧ሻ כ ൫୫ୟ୶ሺଡ଼ሺ୲ሻ୲א୘ ൐ ݔ ോ ୧൯୧ (15) 
D. Vulnerability functions 
Several authors suggest vulnerability functions in the 
literature. Reference [2] defines vulnerability and 
improvability of a network 
 as elements of evaluation.  
(respectively ) is the set of damages (respectively set of 
improvements) possible in the infrastructure ܩ . ሺ
ǡ ሻ 
(respectively ሺ
ǡ ) is the network configuration after the 
damage  א  (respectively after the improvement  א ). 
The importance of damage d (respectively improvement i) is 
measured by the relative decrease (increase) of performance ȟԄି ോ Ԅ  (respectively ȟԄା ോ Ԅ  ). With Ԅሾ
ሿ ൒ Ͳ  and ȟԄି ൌ Ԅሾ
ሿ െ Ԅሾࣞሺ
ǡ ሻሿ  the relative decline in system 
performance caused by the damage  . 
( ȟԄା ൌ Ԅሾሺ
ǡ ሻሿ െ Ԅሾ
ሿ  is the relative increase in 
performance due to the improvement action i. The critical 
damage (improvement) כ א ࣞ  ( כ א  ) is the damage 
(improvement) that minimizes Ԅሾࣞሺ
ǡ ሻሿ  (maximize Ԅሾሺ
ǡ ሻሿ). Vulnerability and improvability are given by: ሾ
ǡ ࣞሿ ൌ மሾୋሿି୛ሾୋǡࣞሿமሾୋሿ  (16) ሾ
ǡࣞሿ ൌ Ԅሾሺ
ǡ כሻሿ is the worst performance of ܩ in 
the set of damage ࣞ 
ሾ
ǡ ሿ ൌ ୆ሾୋǡ୍ሿିமሾୋሿமሾୋሿ  (17) ሾ
ǡ ሿ ൌ Ԅሾሺ
ǡ כሻሿ is the best performance of 
 in the 
set of improvement . 
For a graph with N nodes et M edges, Criado defines a 
vulnerability function by: ሺ
ሻ ൌ  ቀ஢୒ ൅  െെ ʹ ൅ ଶ୒ቁ (18) 
Its value varies between Ͳ  and ͳ . ɐ  is the standard 
deviation of the degree distribution. This function does not 
take into account the vulnerability indicators such as 
cohesion (degree of the vertices) and adhesion (edges 
degree) [25] and [28]. Moreover, the term does not allow 
comparison between networks of different sizes and 
structures [25]. Different ways of quantifying the 
vulnerability do not consider some elements that however 
seem important from our point of view. We analyze this 
potential lacuna in the next section. 
VI. LIMITATIONS OF MODELING TOOLS 
A. The edges are directed 
In network modeling, the edges orientations are not often 
taken into account which skews the results [27]. Let us 
consider the two unweight graphs shown in (Figure 4). 
In the graph (a), the edges are not oriented; the distance 
between nodes 1 and 5 is 2 units. On the contrary in the 
graph (b), edges are oriented bringing this same distance to 3 
units. Because of it, it is no longer possible to go from 1 to 5 
through 2, the edge between 1 and 2, allowing only a flow 
from 2 to 1in one way. Oriented graphs are found in many 
technological networks. This is the case of roads where 
highways are oriented as well as in power grid where power 
is transmitted from sources to targets. A modification of the 
distance has significant consequences on the structural 
parameters seen above. We propose to consider two new 
elements: reversibility and reciprocity. 
Reversibility: It determines the ability of an edge to 
transport the material or the information in the opposite 
direction in case of disaster. This ability may be a function or 
be set by decision-makers. 
Reciprocity: Obviously, the non-orientation of edges has 
no significant influence on some networks. Therefore we 
define reciprocity as the average probability that two vertices 
are linked in both directions. ሺ
ሻ ൌ ୒୳୫ୠୣ୰୭୤୮ୟ୧୰ୱ୭୤୴ୣ୰୲୧ୡୣୱ୒୳୫ୠୣ୰୭୤୪୭୭୮ୱ୪୧୬୩୧୬୥୲୵୭ୟୢ୨ୟୡୣ୬୲୴ୣ୰୲୧ୡୣୱ ȋͳͻȌ
B. The graphs must be weighted 
Some authors do not take into account the weight of 
edges in their analysis. In reality, the edges are often 
weighted. This weight can be a length, cost, impedance etc. 
To show the importance of weight, let us consider the 
following graphs. 
As in the previous example, the distance between vertices 
1 and 5 through 2 is two units. And the distance between 
these same two nodes through 3 and 4 is three units. If we 
assign weights to the edges as in figure (b), these distances 
become 11 and 7 respectively. The second path is then the 
shortest. The shortest path between two vertices is closely 
related to the weight of the edges and not taking it into 
account can affect the structural parameters of vulnerability. 
In our point of view, the weight must reflect at least the 
geodesic distance, time and cost. 
C. The nodes are of different types 
In some networks, such as power grids, it is essential to 
distinguish different types of vertices [6]. 
1 
3 4 
5 2 
1 
3 4 
5 2 
Figure 4 (b) : Directed network 
Figure 4 (a) : Undirected network 
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Figure 5 (b) :Weighted network 
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Figure 5 (a): Unweight network 
By analyzing the above two networks (Figure 6), one can 
say about the graph (a) that node 3 is the most important in 
the point of view of efficiency, and centrality. On the 
contrary, by considering in the second graph that node 4 is 
the source of the element circulating in the network, 3 is used 
as a transporting relay and 2 and 5 are the destinations we 
cans say that node 4 will be the most important. By 
removing it in the network, the element will not flow over 
the network unlike in the first case. The network structure is 
less affected by removing 4 than 3, but the function is much 
more dependent on 4 than 3. To tackle this problem and 
those cited above, we define a component class shown in 
figure 7. 
D. Component class in the analysis of network vulnerability 
There are three types of components: Sources, Targets 
and Relays [6]. This distinction is not important enough to 
analyze the networks. To show this, let us consider three 
networks, one modeling a subway system, the other a power 
grid, and the last a bus network in the same geographical 
zone. The vulnerability of the subway system is very 
depending on the bus network capacity - which in reality can 
be substituted to the subways. Moreover, the two networks 
interact with the power grid, which supply them. The last is 
vulnerable to disruptions of bus and metro (staff transport for 
example). Analysis of the three networks separately does not 
allow understanding their dynamics. We therefore propose a 
multi network analysis by defining several types. 
Potential component: A potential component is a 
component that does not physically exist in the structure but 
that we can make functional depending on time and / or 
investment. Practically, there are often ways to link a node to 
another one in case of emergency. This may be true in the 
case of roads which are not usable for some reason but with 
some slight adaptations can be used at the occurrence of a 
disaster. Their numbers and their restorability3 are factors 
that significantly reduce the vulnerability of the entire 
network. The network analysis must take into account these 
structures by describing them as much as possible before the 
disaster. The potential vertices and edges are characterized 
by the same parameters as the real component (nodes and 
edges) but will have different influences on networks for 
identical topology. 
Element: It is the object that travels through the network; 
this may be information, matter, energy, etc. We define the 
set of elements types by ߳ ൌ ሺԖଵǡ Ԗଶǥɂ୊Ǣ ȁԖȁ ൌ 	ሻǤModeling 
multi-network traffic involves several elements. 
Shunting or circulation rules: Let’s consider the network 
shown in Figure 7. Parameters respectively indicate the 
distance, cost and travel time. Given an element located in 1 
and wishing to travel to 7. From the perspective of the 
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Figure 7: Element class 
distance, the path is 1-4-7. But if we consider the cost of 
transporting, this path becomes 1-2-4-7. Considering only 
the travel time, this same path is made of nodes 1-3-5-6-7. 
The rule of circulation can vary with time or other 
constraints. It is therefore important to define it clearly for all 
elements, because they play a major role in the dynamics of 
the networks. 
Simplicity : To reflect the multiplicity of elements flowing 
through the network, we introduce the notion of simplicity. 
The simplicity ୧୨୩  of two nodes of type   ሺ୧୩ǡ ୨୩ǡ ୧୩ ്୨୩ሻ  is the number of edges of type k incidents with the 
nodes ୧୩ and ୨୩ . The simplicity of two nodes is then the 
average of the simplicities of all types. ୧୨ ൌ ሺͳ ോ ɂ୩ሻσ ୧୨୩୩  (20) 
where ɂ୩ is the number of edges of type . 
The simplicity of a graph is then: ሺ
ሻ ൌ ቂ ଶ୒ሺ୒ିଵሻቃ כ σ ୧୨ (21) 
Physical and / or functional Interdependence: The 
damage to a component disrupts the function of other 
network elements. To illustrate it, it is sometimes defined a 
conditional probability function between vertices [22]. 
Parameters: The vulnerability analysis requires 
considering parameters that are not only structural (see 
different classes of vulnerability). A parameter may be a 
function of other parameters. The geographical coordinates 
of a vertex may, for example, inform about the related risks 
by the way of a correlation with an external database. The 
parameters are used to distinguish one vertex or edge from 
another one. For example, a node may be a central power 
whose properties are different from another one according to 
the power. 
VII. VULNERABILITY MODEL ANALYSIS 
For the analysis of vulnerability, we propose a closed 
loop system. The output is determined by decision makers 
and may be damage, prejudice, loses or a service function 
(eg electricity consumption). The entry model is the hazard. 
The system itself is broken down into Population and 
Territory. The population is affected by the effects of the 
hazard through the Infrastructure components. A hazard has 
a frequency and / or magnitude. It impacts on the structure 
and / or function of the territory elements. This influence is 
reflected by the element S which converts the intensity 
and/or frequency on the network parameters. (Failure rate, 
centrality, etc.). Through the vulnerability model obtained, 
we can estimate the damage or, for a set of damage, 
determine the critical points of the network and the actions to 
be carried out. This task concerns the decision makers which 
will use the decision support model to inform the population 
and define the actions to be undertaken on the network or on 
the hazard effects. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
Natural disasters with severe consequences have 
increased over the last decade. The material and human 
losses also depend on the state of infrastructure affected and 
on the ability of decision makers to manage the crisis. The 
objective of this study was first to analyze the academic 
work dealing with network modeling and second to propose 
a model of vulnerability. The vulnerability analysis being 
often confused with risk analysis, we have distinguished the 
two concepts, which however appear to be very 
complementary. This distinction and the specification of 
components have been essential to define vulnerability. The 
literature review of network modeling based on graph theory 
made it possible to distinguish the structural indicators of 
vulnerability. We then noted some shortcomings and propose 
ways to overcome them. The vulnerability model we 
proposed considers the dynamics of the network. We have 
shown that the knowledge of circulation rules is crucial for 
the analysis of infrastructures. We have taken into account 
structural, dynamic and environmental aspects of the 
considered infrastructure. This study can be considered as a 
stepping stone toward an algorithm-based approach for 
calculating the parameters of vulnerability by taking into 
account the new elements introduced. Further developments 
will deal with the design of decision support integrating 
societal settings. 
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